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Fiscal austerity's  threat  to normal  policy  goals  looms  even
larger because  many  of its effects  are unexpected  and
poorly urnderstood.
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A key question for stabilization programs is this:  * Maintaining self-reliance in trade and
How do governments get into fiscal difficulty in  external finance?
the first place?
It makes each of these tasks harder, because
Three views predominate:  the political  of the incomplete understanding of the likely
deficit, the structural deficit, and the inflation  effects of fiscal measures.
tax.  In the first view, the state is forced toward
taxing too little and spending too much, both to  First, policymakers need to know more
pay off specific interest groups and to sustain  about the specific effects of different policies.
employment thrugh  aggregate demand.  In the  For example, cuts in public investment may also
secord view, the e,inomy  suffers a contraction-  cause private capital formation to decline.
ary shock - such a,, falling terms of trade or  Changes in the prices that public enterprises
interest rate incirsions  on extemal debt - charge for food or essential services can have
which the govenmment  tries to offset by fiscal  strong distributional repercussions. And the
means in the short run.  In the third view, the  bidding up of interest rates can, if accompanied
state indulges the desire to use revenue from the  by other incentives, make capital repatriation
inflation tax in the absence of other sources.  and emigrant reiidittance  more likely.
Fiscal deficits thus have numerous causes-  Second, fiscal measures should not be inde-
not all of them irrational, not all adding to aggre-  pendent of other policy moves.  If devaluation
gate demand.  Reducing the deficit is neverthe-  causes contraction, teaming it with fiscal re-
less the sine qua non of orthodox stabilization  straint may lead to extreme losses of output -
packages.  How does such austerity affect an  the overkill for which orthodox programs are
economy's chances of achieving th,e  normal  often criticized.
policy goals of:
Third, fiscal measures can sometimes
*  Maintaining socially acceptable capacity  substitute for other (less savory) policy changes.
use and growth?  For example, the narrower and more directed
fiscal interventions can avoid many of
* Keeping inflation tolerable?  devaluation's unpleasant economywide effects
(political visibility, output contractions, and
*  Altering the distributions of income and  price inflation because of the higher costs of
wealth?  imported inputs).
This is a background paper for the 1988 World Development Report.  Copies are
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Figure 2 ...................  6This  paper  is  about  fiscal  policy  issues  that  arise  during
macroeconomic  stabilization  in  developing  economies.  The  empirical
background  comes  from  a  recent  study  of stabilization  episodes  in
18 countries,  organized  by the  World  Institute  for  Development
Economics  Research  (WIDER)  in Helsinki.  The  results  are  reviewed
in a summary  monograph  by Taylor  (1988),  and  the  country  papers
are  available  fron  WIDER.
Fiscal  policy  cannot  be  described  outside  a  macroeconosic
framework.  Section  1 sets  out  the  basics,  as  tbey  apply  in  the
WIDER  studies.  Section  2 takes  up tbree  theories  about  the  fiscal
deficit  --  it may  rise  for  political  or structural  reasons,  or
perhaps  because  the  relevant  authorities  want  to  maximize  revenue
trom  the  inflation  tax.  Section  3 is  about  the  effects  of deficit
reduction,  a  central  component  of orthodox  stabilization  packages.
Section  4  takes  up  other  fiscal  topics  brought  up in the  WIDER
country  papers.
1.  Macroeconomic  Backoround
There  are  four  classic  modes  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  in
the  short  run  --  changes  in the  level  of output,  the  trade
balance,  income  distribution,  and  real  wealth. We begin  with  the
first,  familiar  from  the  General  Theory  and  countless  macro
textbooks  in its  wake.  a  demand  injection,  say  greater  government
spending  or reduced  taxes,  makes  economic  activity  rise.  The
increased  production  generates  additional  income,  which  feeds  back
into  more  consumption,  still  greater  output,  and  so on  until  the
multiplier  chain  converges  to an equilibrium  level  of supply.
This  story  is  well-known,  and  emphasized  in  the  WIDER
1studies.  Stabilization  programs  based  unon  austerity  always
concentrate  on reducing  the  fiscal  deficit.  As discussed  in
section  3, they  set  off  a contractionary  multiplier  output
response  instead  of slowing  price  increases  as  they  are  often
meant  to  do.  Expansionary  policies  may  stimulate  output  within
some  range,  the  prior  lisits  to wbich  are  uncertain  ex  ante  but
essential  to policy  design.
Besides  the  fiscal  position,  the  income  distribution  may also
change  iu response  to policy  maneuvers  or other  forces.  In
stabilization  packages,  "incomes  policies,"  which  often  have a
large  fiscal  content,  are  directed  toward  distributional  ends.
Orthodox  programs,  for  example,  frequently  incorporate  %x7e cuts,
price  increases  for  export  crops,  and  other  moves  aimL
changing  the  pattern  of resource  allocation.  what  is theiz  effect
on the  level  of economic  activity?
Co  answer  such  a question,  one  must  begin  by distinguishing
relevent  economic  groups,  i.e.  by setting  up  a class  structure.
Although  the  WIDER  studies  work  with  fairly  complex  "social
matrixes"  to support  their  distributional  analyses,  we stick  with
the  basics  here.  The simplest  and  most  traditional  model  focuses
on  worker-capitalist  conflict  over  an  index  of distribution,  say
the  real  wage.
How  does  the  level  of activity  adjust  when  the  real  wage (or
more  generally  an indicator  of the  progressiveness  of the  income
distribution)  goes  up?  Economists  concentrate  on two  standard
lines  of response.  The  generally  orthodox  story  is  that  a  higher
wage  forces  employers  to cut  back  on  jobs  while  at the  same  time
exports  fall  because  they  become  less  cost-competitive.  Through
2both  channels,  real  wage  increases  sake  output  decline.
Contrariwise,  wage  cuts  stimulate  production.  This  sort  of  output
responso  is  often  presumed  by  designers  of  orthodox  stabilization
programs.
Alternatively,  wage  cuts  are;  likely  to  hold  down  consumer
demand  and  thereby  the  level  of  output  --  a  coxmon  observation  in
the  WIDER  studies.  If  private  investment  responds  to  the  level  of
activity,  as  in  standard  accelerator  investment  theories,  capital
formation  and  growth  will  also  decline.  Real  wage  reductions  lead
to  economic  stagnation;  wage  increases  perk  up  a  sluggish  system.
This  sort  of  response  to  distributional  change  is  sometimes  called
"stagnationist;"  its  mirror  image  of  output  increases  ir  response
to  wage  reductions  characterizes  an  "exhilarationist"  macro
system.
Although  there  is  no  certainty  regarding  the  matter,  one
might  expect  stagnationist  adjustment  when  the  real  wage  is  low,
and  exhilaration  when  it  is  high. The  "Output  response"  curve  in
Figure  1  is  based  on  these  hypotheses,  with  a  positive  slope  for
low  wage  levels,  and  a  negative  slope  for  high  ones. If  output
adjustment  to  demand  changes  is  rapid  (the  usual  supposition),  the
economy  will  "always"  be  on  the  output  response  locus,  unless
other  restrictions  bind.  The  locus  will  change  its  position  in
response  to  policy  moves.  Expansionary  fiscal  actions  shift  it  to
the  right,  increasing  economic  activity  with  an  unchanged  income
distribution.
What  forms  could  additional  restrictions  on  output  take?
Production  in  developing  economies  is  subject  to  several  kinds  of





Figure  1:  Relationship  between  the  real  wage  and  output
with  no capacity  constraint.
4imports  (the  usual  case  when  import  substitution  of  final  goods
has  been  pursued),  scarce  foreign  exchange  may limit  potential
supply.  At  times,  capacity  within  key  sectors  or  their
suppliers  (e.g.  of  non-traded  infrastructurai  inputs  such  as
transport  and  energy)  may  hold  down  production  levels.  Finally,  in
the  short  run  supplies  . xey  commodities  like  staple  foods  will
be  determined  by  weather  :onditions  and  the  seasonal  cycle.  At
the  macro  level,  411  these  constraints  add  up  to  a "Capacity
limit,"  the  vertical  line  in  Figure  2.
In  Figure  2,  the  economy  may  operate  below  capacity  either
along  the  stagnationist  segment  AB  or  in  the  exhilarationist  range
CD. Along  the  line  segment  BC,  production  constraints  bind.
Below  full  capacity,  adjustment  of  output  toward  the  relevant
curve  is  usually  assumed  to  be  rapid,  as  show:1  by  the  small
arrows.  The  interesting  question  in  terms  of  the  diagram  is  how  to
describe  macro  adjustment  when  capacity  limits  begin  to  bind,  due
for  example  to  progressive  income  redistribution  in  a
stagnationist  economy  or  expansionary  policy  which  shifts  the
entire  Ouput  response  curve  to  the  right.  Three  adjustment
mechanisms  are  emphasized  in  the  WIDER  studies.
First,  a  demand  level  exceeding  capacity  will  probably  make
prices  rise.  If  the  nominal  wage  is  not  fully  indexed  to
inflation,  the  real  wage  declines,  reducing  demand  and  output  in  a
stagnationist  system.  Short-run  irflationary  adjustment  via
workers's  "forced  saving"  (or  "automatic  lacking"  in  Dennis
Robertson's  phrase)  toward  limited  capacity  is  stable  in  this  case
--  the  segment  BZ in  Figure  2.  If the  economy  behaves  in
exhilarationist  fashion  --  segment  7r  --  price  increases  raise
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Figure  2:  Modes  of  adjustment  with  and  Without  a  binding
capacity  constraint.
6profits,  atimulate  investment,  and  l.ad  toward  hyperinflation  in
response  to an initial  increment  in  demand. Such  cases  may
occasionally  arise,  but  not  in the  VIDER  sample.
Second,  the  initial  price  inrrease  will  reduce  "real
balances,"  i.e.  the  money  stock  divided  by the  price  level.  Witb
the  real  value  of their  assets  reduced  by this  change,
wealth-holders  may  save  more  to compensate,  cutting  aggregate
demand.  This  process  runs  parallel  to forced  saving  -- the  two  are
difficult  to distinguish  in practice.
When there  is  an ongoing  inflation,  the  real  balance
adjustment  can  be reinterpreted  as  an "inflation  tax."  To see  how,
we can  invoke  the  quantity  theory  of  money  as enshrined  in the
"equation  of exchange,"  NV a  PX,  where  N is  the  money  supply,  V is
velocity  (taken  to  be an institutionally  determined  constant),  P
is the  price  level,  and  X  is  output  (assumed  fixed  by supply
conditions  or capacity).  If we let  "hats"  over  variables  denote
their  rates  of growth,  the  dynamic  version  of the  quantity
equation  is  N - P  +  X, where  N - AM/,  etc.  and  velocity  is
assumed  constant.
This  new  equation  simply  states  that  the  growth  rate  of the
money  supply  equals  the  sum  of the  inflation  rate  and  the  output
growth  rate  - a tautology  when  V is  constant.  Modest  additional
manipulation  produces  AN - AP(N/P)  +  PAX/V. An incremental
increase  in  money  supply  (from  an increased  fiscal  deficit
financed  at the  central  bank,  for  example)  decomposes  into  the
instantaneous  loss  in  real  balances  M/P  due  to a  price  increase  AP
(sometimes  called  the  "inflation  tax")  and  an output  growth  term
(sometimes  called  "seignorage,"  although  terminology  is not  fully
7standardized  in  this  area).
The  pure  tax  yield  rises  along,with  inflation.  However,  if  V
gradually  declines  as  P  riseq  (an  empirical  trulsm),  the
seignorage  yield  declines.  Governments  at  times  are  said  to  pusb
up  aggregate  demand,  hoping  to  finance  the  corresponding  fiscal
deficit  via  seignorage  and  the  inflation  tax.  As  we  will  see
below,  the  assertion  in  prac%ice  seems  a  bit  far-fetched.
A final  means  of  evading  capacity  liaitations  is  through
imports  --  the  economy  can  satisfy  increased  demand  while  meeting
-cal  supply  restrictions  through  this  device.  Two  problems  ar;
One,  technical,  is  that  essentially  non-traded  goods  such  as
infr4structure  services  and  the  construction  component  of
investment  are  not  easy  to  bring  in  to  alleviate  capacity  limits.
With  high  demand,  prices  for  such  comsodities  are  bound  to rise.
Second,  foreign  exchange  has  to  be  available  from  reserves  or
capital  inflows  to  finance  extra  purchases  abroad.  Such  plenitude
of  dollars  is  rare  in  the  Third  World.
2.  The  Fiscal  Deficit
Against  this  macroeconomic  backdrop,  we  can  ask  a  key
question  for  stabilization  programs:  How  does  a  government  get
into  fiscal  difficulty  --  conventionally  defined  as  a  large  and/or
increasing  public  sector  deficit  --  in  the  first  place?  Three
views  predominate  in  the  literature.  They  can  be  labelled  the
political  deficit,  the  structur-I  deficit,  and  the  inflation  tax
approaches  respectively.
Blaming  political  forces  for  fiscal  expansion  is  an  old
tradition  in  economics,  shared  by  conservatives  such  as  Schumpeter
(1954)  and  radicals  like  O'Connor  (1973)  at  different  places  and
8times.  The  general  view is  that  to  maintain  its  political
legitimacy,  the  state  is forced  toward  taxing  too  little  or
spending  too  much,  bc.th  to  pay  off  specific  interest  groups  and
(in  a  Keynesian  twist)  to sustain  the  level  of employment  via
aggregate  demand.  This  policy  bias  leads  ultimately  to increasing
external  deficits  and/or  inflation,  requiring  stabilization
through  daficit  reduction  in some  long  run.  In Figure  2, the
expansionary  policies  shift  the  Output  response  schedule  so far  to
the  right  that  with  a  given  income  distribution,  capacity  limits
begin  to  bind.  The  resulting  inflation,  income  and  wealth
redistribution,  and/or  import  increases  become  intolerable  after  a
time.
In one  example  of this  line  of thought,  the  Mexican  crisis
after  1982  is attributed  by some  analysts  to  politically  driven
expansion  by a government  which  overestimated  its  spending  power
from  the  oil  and  foreign  borrowing  booms  of the  1970's.  Inflation
did  not  accelerate  dramatically  until  after  1982,  but  before  then
unsustainable  levels  of imports  were  said  to  be the  result.
Elsewhere,  as  in Sri  Lanka  and  Turkey  in the  1970's  and  in
Ghana  for  two  decades  after  the  early  1960's,  political  disruption
reflected  itself  in  large  fiscal  deficits  as politicians  grasped
at whatever  means  were  available  to retain  power (usually  without
much  success).  Finally,  politically  directed  redistribution  plus
expansionary  fiscal  policy  in the  stagnationist  economy  of
Salvador  Allende's  Chile  stimulated  output  to  the  point  at  which
capacity  limits  bound,  triggering  inflation  and  external
imbalance.  In all  these  cases,  stabilizations  ultimately  took
place,  but  their  basic  causes  did  not  come  from  the  economic
9sphere.
Structurtlist  economists  are  by  no  means  opposed  to  invoking
politics  to  explain  degicits,  but  also  suggest  other  reasons  for
them  to  exist.  One  is  an  external  shock  --  falling  terms  of  trade,
an  export  supply  shortfall,  or  an  interest  rate  excursion  on
external  debt.  Such  shocks  are  contractionary;  most  governments
try  to  offset  tbem  in  the  short  run  by  fiscal  means.  Causality
runs  from  the  external  to  internal  deficit,  reversing  the  usual
political  link.  If  the  shock  proves  long-lasting,  foreign  finance
may  dry  up,  forcing  attempts  at  stabilization  and  general
improvement  of  the  economy's  trade  .'erformance.
During  the  past  decade  or  so,  many  developing  countries  have
undergone  shocks  of  this  sort.  For  example,  with  benefit  of
hindsight  one  can  argue  that  the  people  in  charge  of  policy  in  the
primary  product  exporting  economies  failed  to  foresee  the  severity
oi  the  decline  in  the  external  terms  of  trade  that  began  in  the
late  1970's.  Orthodox  macro  theory  suggests  that  one  should
"finance  temporary  shocks  and  adjust  to  permanent  ones."  The
recommendation  looks  reasonable  in  a  textbook,  but  is  impractical
in  the  real  world.  One  initially  tries  to  ride  out  a  shock  by
supporting  domestic  demand,  and  learns  only  as  the  "dark  forces  of
time  and  ignorance"  play  their  hand  that  it  is  "permanent."
Sensible  policy-makers  (as  opposed  to  theory's  rational  agents
equipped  with  perfect  foresight)  would  do  nothing  else.  Their
countries's  fiscal  deficits  widened  substantially  as a
consequence.
Besides  external  shocks,  other  structural  factors  may  force
fiscal  expansion.  They  include  natural  disasters,  financial
10turmoil,  ongoing  inflation  with  indexed  government  debt,  and
foreign  payments  obligations.
The  disaster  secenario  is  familiar.  It  requires  little
comment  beyond  tno  observation  that  relief  efforts  have  both  a
supply  and  demand  dimension.  Not  only  must  commodities  be supplied
to  victims,  they  must  also  be in  demand.  For  example,  one  recent
theory  (Sen,  1981)  attributes  famine  largely  to a  demand  collapse
induced  by  rising  food  prices  in the  face  of fixed  nominal  incomes
--  an  extreme  case  of forced  saving.  Restoring  demand  involves
fiscal  deficit  spending  to transfer  income  to the  groups  hit
hardest  by the  price  increases.
Financial  collapse  lies  at  the  root  of many  stabilizations.
One  thinks  of  recent  experiences  in South  America's  Southern  Cone
(Diaz-Alejandro,  1981),  the  Philippines,  Turkey,  Kuwait,  and
elsewhere.  There  are  strong  family  resemblances  among  recent
financial  developments  in all  these  economies.
The  typical  scenario  begins  with  a  surge  in speculation
involving  shares  and/or  real  estate.  A bubble  is  most  likely  to
blow  itself  up when  potential  saving  is high (say  from  regressive
income  redistribution),  productive  investment  outlets  do not  seem
to  be available,  and (in  recent  cases)  when  deregulation  of the
financial  system  opens  possibilities  for  manipulation.  Under  such
conditions,  ways  to generate  speculative  gains  recur  throughout
capitalism's  history.  They  were  promptly  rediscovered  in the  Third
World.
During  Chile's  free  market  boom  of the  late  1970's,
conglomerates  were  created  by groups  with  nicknames  like  the
Piranhas  and  Crocodiles  around  firms  denationalized  by the
11Pinochet  government  after  the  Allende  period.  In  a  deregulated
financial  environment,  they  promptly  borrowed  from  banks  under
their  control  to  bid  up their  own  share  prices  until  the  stock
market  crashed.  The  Philippine  central  bank  itself  issued  high
interest  paper  to finance  Ferdinand  Marcos's  electioneering,
drying  up private  credit  and  provoking  an output  collapse.  Kuwaiti
investors  wrote  post-dated  checks  to  cover  stock  transactions.
which  then  circulated  as  an alternative  means  of  payment  until
they  had to  be called.
Sucb  devices  can  only  function  for  a  time  --  a  crash  is
inevitable  when  confidence  in  unbacked  financial  instruments
breaks  down.  The  collapse  leaves  firms  and  banks  with  badly
compromised  balance  sheet  positions  --  there  is  usually  a
"debt-deflation"  recession,  in Irving  Fisher's  (1933)  phrase.  The
subsequent  bail-out  involves  fiscal  outlays  and  heavy
rediscounting  by the  central  bank  of commercial  bank  loans.  The
government  aay  also  issue  its  internal  obligations  in exchange  for
the  private  sector's  foreign  debt,  and  may  have  direct  problems
with the  balance  sheets  of public  enterprises.  Finally,  disruption
in  local  financial  markets  provokes  capital  flight. It  tends  to
be acre  serious  under  deregulated  financial  regimes  in  which
exchange  controls  have  been  weakened  or removed.
Nost of these  interventions  increase  the  state's  deficit.  For
example,  Argentina  now  has  a newly  coined  "quasi-fiscal  deficit"
which  is  basically  a  continuing  transfer  to  commercial  banks  to
enable  them  to pay  high  interest  rates  on deposits  to forestall
capital  flight.  In that  country  and  elsewhere,  the  central  bank's
wide  open rediscount  window  tempts  provincial  politicians  with
12development  banks  under  their  thumbs  to  spend  freely.  The  local
banks  can  always  rediscount  their  loans  in  the  capital,  and  the
consolidated  government  deficit  soars  up.  Through  these  and
similar  channels,  financial  collapse  usually  makes  the  overall
fiscal  position  worse.
The  next  structural  cause  of  a  fiscal  deficit  is  monetary
indexation  under  continuing  inflation.  Before  going  into  details,
it  makes  sense  to  digress  briefly  to  discuss  the  causes  of
inflation  inself.
Ongoing  inflationary  processes  can  arise  for  many  reasons  --
they  are  highly  dependent  on  the  nature  of  the  economy  at  hand.
Theories  about  them  fall  into  two  classes  --  monetarist  and
structuralist.  The  monetarist  view  has  already  been  discussed  in
connection  with  the  equation  of  exchange.  Rapid  growth  in  the
money  supply  (said  to  result  principally  from  monetization  of  the
fiscal  deficit  in  an  economy  where  the  financial  market  is  not
well  enough  developed  to  permit  the  state  to  borrow  from  sources
besides  the  central  bank)  signals  excess  commodity  demand.
According  to  the  quantity  tbeory,  money  growth  transforms  itself
into  proportional  price  increases.  The  cure  for  inflation  on  the
basis  of  this  reasoning  is  to  cut  demand  by  reducing  the  deficit
--  a  prescription  that  often  is  ineffective,  as  we  will  see  below.
Structural  inflation  theory  argues  more  from  the  side  of
costs  than  demand,  emphasizing  distributional  conflict  and
indexation  mechanisms.  An  initial  price  excursion  --  say  from  a
supply  sbock,  a  period  of  forced  saving  in  response  to
expansionary  policy  or  an  increase  in  local  spending  power  as  from
an  export  price  increase,  or  a  cost  shock  such  as  devaluation  --
13reduces  some  income  flows  in  real  terms.  The  shock  marks  the  first
stage  of  inflation,  during  which  distributional  losers  try  to
fight  back.
Their  major  weapons  are  the  prices  over  which  they  have
control.  Workers,  for  example,  push  for  higher  nominal  wages.  Wage
pressure  drives  up  production  costs;  final  goods  prices  rise  in
turn  via  mark-ups.  Such  reactions  set  the  stage  for  an
inflationary  spiral,  more  rapid  insofar  as  individual  prices  are
indexed  with  short  lags  to  the  whole  set.  when  indexation  takes
over  completely,  the  iDilation  becomes  self-sustaining  ("inertial"
in  the  jargon),  and  the  original  distributional  strife  may  be
forgotten.  Recent  "heterodox  shock"  anti-inflation  programs  in
Latin  America  have  been  based  on  a  diagnosis  of  inertial
inflation.  Their  fiscal  implications  are  taken  up  in  section  4.
If  inflation  is  structural,  it  steadily  erodes  the  real  value
of  the  money  supply  --  the  inflation  tax  begins  to  bite.  One  way
to  avoid  this  problem  is  to  index  money  by  paying  interest  on  all
state  obligations.  In  principle,  such  a  policy  is  fiscally
neutral.  The  inflation  tax  cuts  demand;  interest  payments  on
government  debt  offset  the  tax.  However,  when  inflation  reaches
triple  digits,  nominal  government  outlays  for  interest  payments
soar. As  discussed  in  the  WIDER  studies,  increased  structural
deficits  because  of  "monetary  correction"  have  been  a  bone  of
contention  between  several  Latin  American  countries  and  the  IMF.
The  Fund's  recent  teudency,  e.g.  in  Mexico,  is  to  accept  the  point
that  the  part  of  the  deficit  supporting  monetary  correction  is  not
a  target  for  reduction  until  structural  inflation  disappears,  but
the  issue  is  still  controversial.
14A  final  structural  source  of  deficits  is  the  need  to  make  a
foreign  transfer.  After  the  debt  crisis  of  the  early  1980's,
governments  in  most  developing  countries  took  over  the  bulk  of
external  obligations,  often  through  financial  system  bail-outs  as
discussed  above.  They  now  face  a  double  transfer  problem  --
externally,  the  country  has  to  run  a  trade  surplus  to  meet  its
debt  payments,  and  internally  the  state  has  to  obtain  foreign
exchange  to  meet  the  payment  targets.
To  get  the  dollars  it  needs,  the  government  either  has  to  tax
exporters  or  buy  tbleir  proceeds  from  them.  If  it  takes  the  latter
course,  it  may  borrow  from  the  central  bank.  In  principle,  no
money  creation  is  involved.  As  the  external  payments  are
accomplished,  foreign  reserves  decline  in  the  same  magnitude  as
government  borrowing  goes  up  --  the  quantity  of  base  money  remains
unchanged.  However,  the  fiscal  deficit  does  rise.  As  with
monetary  cerrection,  this  sort  of  deficit  spending  has  been  a
major  source  of  controversy  between  indebted  countries  and  the
Fund.
A  final  reason  for  deficit  spending  --  often  proposed  by
monetarist  economists  --  is  the  state's  desire  to  use  revenue  from
the  inflation  tax  in  the  absence  of  other  feasible  sources.  This;
view  evidently  harks  back  to  political  theories  of  the  deficit  --
the  inflation  tax  just  gives  it  an  economic  twist.  Since
monetarists  usually  assume  that  the  level  of  output  is  fixed  from
the  side  of  supply,  they  think  that  the  tax  has  no  effects  on  the
real  economy.  It  just  boils  down  to  a transfer  from  wealth-holders
to  the  state.  Since  seignorage  yield  declines  with  increasing
velocity,  some  inflation  rate  will  maximize  fiscal  revenue.  A
15sort  of Laffer  curve  is involved,  because  inflation  also  tends  to
cut  back  on ordinary  tax  yields  because  of  payments  lags  in the
system  (Tanzi,  1977).
One  can  try  to  calculate  the  inflation  rate  that  maximizes
revenue  --  it often  turns  out  to  be in  the  double  digits.  In the
Third  World,  many  inflations  run  at a faster  pace.  Either
incompetent  computation  or additional  factors  must  be behind  such
rapid  price  increases.  Widespread  indexation  which  makes  the
inflation  rate  highly  sensitive  to  upward  shocks  and  possible
macro  instiaility  (as  along  segment  ZC in  Figure  2) are  more
ikely  culprits,  or so the  authors  of the  WIDER  studies  believe.
3. Effects  of  Deficit  Reduction
The foregoing  discussion  suggests  that  fiscal  deficits  have
numerous  causes  --  not  all  deficits  are  irrational,  and  not  all
add  to aggregate  demand.  Nonetheless,  deficit  reduction  is the
sine  aua  non  of orthodox  stabilization  packages  of the  type
usually  proposed  by the  Bank  and  Fund.  How  does  such  austerity
affect  the  economy's  chances  of achieving  normal  policy  goals?
Most  governments  share  at least  four  economic  targets:
(1)  to  maintain  socially  acceptable  levels  of capacity
utilization  and  growth,  especially  in  sectors  and  regions
dominated  by their  political  base;
(2)  to keep  inflation  down  to a  rate  tolerable  in terms  of
the  country's  own  history  of price  increases  and  social  defenses
against  them;
(3)  to alter  wealth  and  income  distributions  in line  with the
regime's  ideological  predilections  and  political  constraints;  and
(4)  to  maintain  a degree  of self-reliance  in trade  and
16external  financial  relationships.
The  previous  section  has  enumerated  some  of  the  macroeconomic
shocks  that  make  these  goals  difficult  to  attain.  In  many  cases,
restrictive  fiscal  policy  only  makes  the  task  harder.
To  see  the  effects  of  cutting  fiscal  deficits,  it  is  useful
to  return  to  Figure  2.  The  orthodox  diagnosis  is  that  an  economy
must  be  stabilized  because  there  is  too  much  aggregate  demand;
standard  programs  don't  pay  much  attention  to  other  destabilizing
forces  like  those  discussed  above.  Absent  the  capacity  limit,  high
demaid  means  that  macro  equilibrium  would  lie  somewhere  on  the
bow-sliaped  portion  of  the  Output  response  schedule  to  the  right  of
the  line  segment  BC.  However,  the  capacity  constraint  is  assumed
to  bind. Inflation  and/or  trade  imbalance  enter  to  allow  output
to  lie  along  BC.  To  obviate  the  need  for  these  forms  of  macro
adjustment,  the  output  locus  should  be  shifted  inward  via  fiscal
restraint.  Since  the  economy  is  initially  in  an  excess  demand
situation,  output  will  not  fall  unless  the  locus  is  shifted
completely  to  the  left  of  the  capacity  limit  line.
The  WIDER  analysts  observe  that  the  results  from  austerity
packages  are  not  quite  what  this  theory  predicts.  Typically,
output  contraction  follows  immediately  upon  imposition  of  fiscal
restraint  --  the  full  capacity  use  component  of  goal  number  (1)  is
sacrificed.  If  austerity  persists,  growth  is  not  rapid  either.  The
reason  is  that  fiscal  contraction  has  no  built-in  means  to  assure
robust  investment  demand.
Private  investment  stagnates  for  at  least  two  reasons.  The
standard  one  is  that  accelerator  mechanisms  will  not  operate  while
economic  activity  is  being  held  down.  The  WIDER  studies  also  argue
17that  because  of structural  complementarities,  increased  public
capital  formation  in  leveloping  economies  crowds  private
investment  in,  not  cut  by  raising  interest  rates  in financial
markets  along  orthodox  lines.  Fiscal  restraint  often  involves  cuts
in public  projects.  If private  investment  is thereby  held  down,
growth  prospects  are  doubly  dimmed  --  by austerity  itself  and  its
special  effects  on capital  formation.
The record  in slowing  inflation  is  not  much  better.  The  WIDER
results  show  that  insofar  as inflation  is  structural,  it  will  be
unaffected  by deficit  cuts.  There  may  be some  slowdown  of price
increases  under  special  circumstances  --  when  most  markets
(including  the  one  for  labor)  are  "flex-price"  in Hicks's  (1965)
terminology  and  when  indexation  mechanisms  are  not  widespread.
Such  conditions  distinctly  do  not  apply  in Latin  America.  In
several  countries  in that  region,  long  periods  of low  demand  have
left  inflation  rates  untouched.  Only  when  recession  drags  on for
several  years  are  citizens's  income  aspirations  cut  back
sufficiently  to permit  stabilization.  In Chile,  heavy-handed
austerity  took  four  years (1974  to 1978)  to cut  the  annual
inflation  rate  from  600  to 30 percent,  meanwhile  doubling  measured
employment  to 18 percent  (or  higher,  if  one  counts  people  on a
government  dole)  at  a real  wage  30  percent  below  that  of 1970.
Mexican  inflation  remains  stubbornly  in the  higher  double  digit
range  despite  five  years  of  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint  after
1982.
The  situation  is  somewhat  different  in a few  African  and
Asian  countries,  e.g.  the  Philippines  where  "only"  five  or six
quarters  were required  to reduce  inflation  from  63  percent  to
18single  digits  in  1984  and  1985,  with  real  GDP  losses  of  6.8  and
3.8  percent  in  the  two  years  respectively.  Ghana  and  India  also
saw  slower  inflation  from  spending  cuts.  All  three  economies  share
flex-price  markets  for  a  large  proport3in  of  final  products  and  no
great  degree  of  indexation  for  the  wage  or  exchange  rate,  the
major  components  of  producer  cost.
Next,  tbere  is  the  external  question.  After  pursuing  import
substitution,  most  developing  economies  become  dependent  on
foreign  intermediate  inputs  to  sustain  production.  Also,  most  of
them  need  to  import  around  one-half  (the  non-construction
component)  of  the  value  of  new  capital  formation.  As  we  have  seen,
austerity  restrains  total  output  and  may  especially  penalize
investment  demand.  Hence,  imports  drop  sharply  and  the  trade
balance  improves.
There  may  also  be  some  improvment  in  exports,  in  two  cases.
The  first  is  when  a  popular  consumption  item  is  also  exported,
e.g.  beef  in  Argentina  or  rice  in  Thailand.  Then  domestic
contraction  will  open  up  a  vent  for  surplus  sales  abroad.  Similar
responses  may  occur  in  the  handful  of  developing  economies  that
have  significant  manufactured  exports.  Lower  domestic  demand
drives  firms  to  search  for  markets  abroad.  Even  in  recent
"miracle"  cases  (e.g.  Turkey),  however,  exporters  have  not
responded  by  increasing  their  own  investment.  This  vent  for
surplus  is  ultimately  self-closing.
Finally,  on  capital  account,  austerity  at  times  slows  capital
flight  by  driving  up  local  interest  rates.  On  the  other  hand,  if
domestic  investment  is  not  strong,  the  repatriated  capital  meets
no  local  demand.  Financial  "sources"  exceed  "uses"  in  the  jargon
19of the  flows  of funds.  The  policy  lesson  is that  domestic
stagnation  does  not  strongly  attract  flown  capital  of (for  that
matter)  other  pools  of foreign  exchange  such  as  the  receipts  of
emigrant  workers.
With regard  to the  income  distribution,  fiscal  austerity
often  involves  scaling  down  social  service  activities  such  as
education  and  health,  as  well  as cutting  back  on food  subsidy  and
similar  programs.  Typically,  the  results  are  regressive.  Direct
impacts  of other  components  of stabilizaton  packages  may  alter  the
distribution  in either  equalizing  or unequalizing  fashion.
Besides  reducing  demand  in a stagnationist  system,  real  wage  cuts
are  likely  to increase  income  concentration.  On the  other  hand,
producer  price  increases  for  food  or export  crops  may  benefit  poor
peasants.  A mixed  baq  of such  outcomes  is perhaps  typical  of most
stabilization  prog:ams.
In summary,  fiscal  austerity  improves  the  trade  balance  by
cutting  back  on the  level  of  economic  activity  and  thereby
imports.  Exports  in some  cases  will  rise  with  reduced  domestic
absorption  in  vent-for-surplus  fashion.  Capacity  utilization  and
growth  will  usually  be retarded,  especially  when  investment  demand
by the  private  sector  responds  positively  to  output  increases  in
accelerator  fashion  or to public  capital  formation  for  reasons  of
complementarity.  Only  in certain  cases  will  deficit  reduction
reduce  inflation  in a reasonable  period  of time;  even  so,  output
losses  are  likely  to be involved. The  distributional  effects  will
as  often  as not  be regressive.  Austerity  is  no panacea  in  a
stabilization  crisis.  It  has to  be supplemented  with  other
policies  to give  acceptable  economic  results.  Some  will  be of a
20fiscal  nature,  as discussed  in the  following  section.
4.  Effects  of Specific  Policy  Moves
The general  thrust  of ths  last  section  is that  when  an
economy  is undergoing  stabilization  involving  austerity,  its  macro
equilibrium  position  may  well  lie  along  the  stagnationist  branch
of the  Output  response  curve  in Figure  2.  As likely  as not,  its
inflationary  process  will  be structural  in nature  since  excess
comodity demand  and/or  reliance  on the  inflation  tax (if  it ever
existed)  has  been  removed.  The  question  at  hand  regards  the  likely
effects  of fiscal  and  other  measures  under  such  circumstances.  The
WIDER  studies  point  to  several  relevant  policy  linkages,  some
al>ady mentioned  in passing.
First,  one  must  be aware  of specific  effects  of different
policies.  As we have  seen,  cutting  public  investment  may  also  lead
private  capital  formation  to decline.  Increasing  indirect  taxes
will  drive  up costs,  possibly  accelerating  a structural  inflation.
Successful  anti-inflation  policies  are  likely  to lead  to more
efficient  tax  collection  as the  effects  of payment  lags  on real
revenues  are  reduced.  Hence,  more  fiscal  demand  contraction  may
occur  than  had  been  planned.
Second,  inflation  reduction  will  have  other  macro  effects
that  have to  be takea  into  consideration.  Besides  increasing  the
tax  take,  Latin  American  heterodox  shock  programs  which  attempted
to  brake  inflation  by de-indexing  the  economy  at a stroke  were
accompanied  by shifts  in  demand  for  money  and  commodities.
Monetary  correction  as  discussed  in section  2  was  never  completely
effective.  As a consequence,  dramatically  slower  inflation  made
velocity  fall  or  money  demand  rise.  Room  was  opened  for  money
21creation,  either  by  fiscal  deficit  spending  or  reserve  increases
from  capital  inflows.  In  Argentina,  the  latter  turned  out  to  be
more  important  in  practice,  but  the  story  could  be  different  in
other  circumstances.
Reducing  inflation  also  got  rid  of  the  inflation  tax.  This
observation  rationalizes  the  fact  that  heterodox  shocks  in  both
Argentina  and  Brazil  were  accompanied  by  rapid  increases  in
consumer  demand  (magnified  in  Brazil  by  a  wage  increase  that
offset  provious  forced  saving).  The  fiscal  restraint  implicit  in
more  effective  direct  and  indirect  tax  collection  was  offset  by
the  expansionary  effect  of  undoing  the  erosion  of  real  wealth  by
steadily  rising  prices.
Monetarist  economists  did  not  anticipate  this  outcome  because
they  typically  postulate  supply-side  determination  of  output.  In
their  view,  eliminating  the  tax  would  only  affect  transfers  from
rentiers  to  the  state,  not  the  level  of  economic  activity.
Structuralists  did  not  think  about  it  because  they  viewed  the
inflation  tax  as  a  monetarist  ploy. Each  side  can  learn  from  the
other  in  future  anti-inflation  programs.  They  will  have  to  do  so
if  the  programs  are  to  succeed,  since  several  interacting
responses  to  slower  inflation  evidently  arise.
Third,  prices  charged  or  offered  by  public  enterprises  are  an
important  component  of  fiscal  policy  in  many  countries.  Changes  in
prices  charged  for  essential  services  or  food  may  have  strong
distributional  repercussions.  If  public  enterprises  sell
intermediate  goods,  then  increasing  their  prices  will  have
ambiguous  effects  on  inflation.  Producers's  costs  will  rise.  They
may  well  pass  them  along  to  final  commodity  prices,  provoking
22structural  inflation.  On the  other  hand,  the  consolidated  public
sector  deficit  will  be reduced,  leading  to less  state  borrowing
from  the  central  bank  and  money  creation.  The  inflation  rate  may
decline  for  sonetarist  reasons.  Which  effect  dominates  is an
important  empirical  question.  Model  simulations  underlying  several
of the  WIDER  studlies  suggest  that  the  cost  linkage  may  be the
stronger.
With  regard  to prices  offered,  crop  marketing  boards  often
play  an important  fiscal  role,  especially  in sub-Saharan  Africa.
Their  profit-and-loss  position  wilt  be strongly  affected  by the
exchange  rate,  since  they  must  cover  the  discrepancies  between
internal  prices  offered  growers  (plus  internal  trade  and  transport
costs)  and  world  prices  converted  to local  currency  terms  through
the  exchange  rate.  By raising  marketing  board  profits  (with
internal  prices  unchanged),  devaluation  becomes  a  direct  fiscal
tool.  More  generally,  the  performance  of the  boards  is  highly
dependent  on exchange  rate  policy,  since  there  are  limits  to the
size  of the  wedges  they  can  drive  between  internal  and  external
crop  prices.
Finally,  welfare  programs  such  as food  subsidies  can  have
important  fiscal  and  balance  of payments  effects.  With  supply
elasticities  in  the  usual  empirical  range,  for  example,  an
increased  subsidy  rate  on food  purchases  will  create  inflationary
pressure  unless  stocks  are  run  down  or imports  brought  in to  meet
the  additional  demand  the  subsidy  creates. If new  supplies  do not
materialize,  a forced  saving  situation  like  the  one  along  segment
BZ in Figure  2  will  arise  --  prices  will  go  up enough  to  offset
both  the  direct  demand  increase  and  the  fiscal  injection  it
23embodies.  Despite  the  subsi  dy,  the  real  purchasers's  price  of
food  could  easily  increase.
A  fourth  observation  is  that  fiscal  measures  should  not  be
undertaken  independeatly  of  ,)ther  policy  moves.  Devaluation,  for
example,  may  at  times  lead  to  output  contraction  in  developing
economies  through  well-known  channels  (Krugman  and  Taylor,  1978).
Suppose  that  one  is  contemplating  combining  fiscal  austerity  and
devaluation  in  a  package  aimed  at  improving  the  trade  balance.
Assume  first  that  devaluation  is  expansionary,  increasing  output.
Then  it  can  safely  be  put  together  with  austerity,  since  it  will
offset  the  latter's  contractionary  effects  discussed  in  section  3.
On  the  other  hand,  if  devaluation  causes  contraction,  teaming  it
with  fiscal  restraint  may  lead  to  extreme  output  loss  --  the
"overkill"  for  which  orthodox  programs  are  often  criticized.  Cool
consideration  of  such  possibilities  makes  sense  before
stabilization  is  attempted.
Fifth,  fiscal  measures  may  substitute  for  other  policies.
Devaluation  stimulates  exports,  but  so  do  favorable  producer
prices  and/or  subsidies.  The  latter,  directed  interventions  do
not  share  devaluation's  unpleasant  economy-wide  effects  (price
inflation  via  increased  intermediate  import  costs,  political
visibility,  possible  output  contraction)  and  may  well  be  the
preferred  option  for  that  reason.
Finally,  the  fiscal  position  will  influence  private  actions
in  external  capital  markets.  Restrictive  policy  makes
repatriation  of  flight  capital  or  emigrant  remittances  more  likely
by  bidding  up  interest  rates.  On  the  other  hand,  financial
incentives  alone  are  not  likely  to  draw  external  resources  toward
24a  stagnant  economy. Growth  or a  semblance  of  growth  (recall
Chile's  fragile  boom  of the  late  1970's)  are  much stronger  stimuli
than  high  local  interest  rates  for  forex  inflows.  Once  the  money
has  arrived,  sensible  exchange  controls  (as  opposed  to market
deregulation)  can  play  soae  role  in  keeping  it  home.  Brazil,
Colombia,  and  South  Korea  are  the  main  capital  control  success
cases  in the  WIDER  sample.  They  avoided  the  capital  flights  that
plagued  economies  with  open  capital  markets  such  as  Argentina,
Mexico,  and  the  Philippines.
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